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IN THI: SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 15920

ROBERT ALEX VALDEZ,
Defendant-Apnellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Robert Alex Valdez, appeals from a
judgment and conviction on jury trial of the crime of negligent
homicide in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION HELOW
The appellant was arrested and charged with second
degree murder in violation of 76-5-203, U.C.A. 1953.

After

preliminary hearing he was held for trial and charged by
infor!'lation with second dee;ree I!!Urder.

Jury trial was held

in the District Court of the Third Judicial District on
June 12, 1978.

The jury returned a verdict on June 14, 1978

of guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent homicide.
The appellant was sentenced on June 15, 1978, to serve one
year in the Salt Lake Count" Jail.

This appeal was taken

on June 23, 1978, from the iudgrnent imposed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-2RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's iud?,ment
and a new trial.
STATDlEllT OF FACTS
The appellant was charged and nrosecuted for the crime
of second degree murder of Melvin Gregory Miller. (R. 10)

ThE

prosecution alleged that the appellant shot Miller on the llti
day of December, 1977, in Salt Lake County.

At the tioe of

trial, there was no dispute that the appellant in fact shot
Miller.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser

included offense of negligent homicide and the appellant was
sentenced to be committed to the Salt Lake County Jail for
one year.

(R. 70, 74).

Debbie Valdez, the daughter of the appellant, (R. 128129) ..

~c

"'~::

J.iving with her father and mother, but at 4:00 a.

on 0ecemoer 11, 1977, entered their home, took a set of automobile keys and drove off alone in her father's car. (R. 129)
Debbie was 15 years of age and had been going with the
deceased, Melvin Miller, for approximately two years.

(R. 138)

She was residing in a motel at the time the offense occurred.
(R. 138)

She admitted having given her parents a bad time ani

had been in the detention home and the Utah State Hospital.
(R. 138-139)

The deceased was approximately 25 vears of age a

rumored to be married. (R. 251, 252)

The appellant, Robert

Valdez, had never seen or met Miller although he had heard
his daughter, Debbie, was going with :Hiller. (R. 252)

t~

Robert

Valdez had been advised by a police officer on the Salt Lake (
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-3Police Department, Detective Green, that Debbie had been hanging
around with the worst kind of people and that Miller had a
criminal record.

(R. 233)

On the morning of December ll, 1977,

Robert Valdez noticed his vehicle had been taken by someone.
(R. 237)

He believed that Debbie had taken the car because the

car was gone and he had not heard his dog bark.

(R. 238)

Valdez

had a gun that he purchased 1;-rhile he v1as working part time with
Webb Se· 'rity as a security guard.

(R. 229)

He got the gun from

the closet and put two bullets in it that a friend had given him.
(R. 238)

He did not have Miller in mind \vhen 1-J.e got his gun,

but intended to scare Debbie to try to get her to go straight.
(R. 237, 238)

Valdez in the company of his brother-in-law,

Billmen LeFevre, went in the latter's vehicle to try and find
Valdez' car.

The vehicle was spotted in the vicinity of North

Temple and Third

~Vest

at approximately 10:40 a.m.

(R. 109, 129)

When Valdez spotted the car, he only observed the driver, Melvin
Miller, a black man.

(R. 241)

He started towards the car when

his brother-in-law said, "That's not Debbie".

He told Miller to

get out of the car and to walk back in the direction of the car
that Valdez and LeFevre had been riding in.

Valdez grabbed

Miller by the shoulder and told him to lean on the car and then
looked back and saw that Debbie was in the Valdez car of which
Miller had gotten out.

(R. 242, 245)

Debbie when the gun went off.

Valdez was looking at

(R. 243)

Valdez testified he

didn't go to kill Miller and he didn't recall i f Hiller had hit
his gun before the shot was fired.

(R. 245)

He indicated that

his brother-in-law may have called out for him to watch out for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Miller.

(R. 246)

Other witnesses to the incident testified tl

Miller, in fact, struck the gun or tapped it just before it ~
off.

Debbie Valdez testified that immediately before the shot

Melvin "chopped the gun" (R. 125) and had testified at prelim.
inary hearing that he hit the gun.

(R. 172)

Janet Klindt, a

bystander in another vehicle, said that she observed the incic
that the black man who had been driving the car got out when
Valdez was holding a gun, that they walked back towards the c1
and she saw the black man fall and she saw Debbie Valctez driv€
away in the car.

(R. 111, 113)

This was corroborated by the

driver of the vehicle in which Janet Klindt was a passenger.
(R. ll9, 126)

Billmen LeFevre testified that he saw Miller af

he got out of the car reach out like he was going to get some·
thing, that he shouted to Valdez "Hatch out, I think he's goir
to pull something out" and that Hiller then hit the gun which
went off and Hiller fell on the car.

(R. 219, 220)

shooting, Valdez told LeFevre to call the police.

After the
(R. 220,

2~

The Valdez vehicle had been reported stolen to the police by
Robert Valdez' wife.

(R. 257)

Police officers had received<

call concerning the stolen vehicle immediately before going t1
the scene of the shooting.

(R. 187)

Valdez remained at the ~

and advised the officer who arrived of the fact of the shooti:
(R. 175).
The bullet that killed Hiller entered in the side of his
head at a rising angle and was expended and came to rest in t'
hatband of the deceased.

(R. 152, 161, 178)

Police examinati:

of the weapon showed that it contained only two bullets, one
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-5which had been fired.

(R. 179)

Valdez' statement to the police

at the scene was that he had been looking for the person who
stole his car, had gotten the ~river who was in his car out of
the vehicle and had the gun out and then "didn't know what
happened." (R. 182)
the time of trial.

This was consistent with his testimony at
(R. 244, 246)

The appellant's statement to

Officer Pat Smith who interrogated him following the shooting was
that he had not seen Miller before the shooting, although he
knew of him through Detective Green and that the gun went off
when he was pushing Miller on the car.
gun to scare Debbie.

(R. 269, 273).

He indicated he took the

It was Robert Valdez'

contention, at the time of trial, as corroborated by other
witnesses that the gun went off after Miller had been removed
from the vehicle and that he did not inte~i r~ shoot Miller
but the killing was an accident.
At the time of trial, defense counsel requested the court to
instruct the jury to the effect that Valdez had a right to use
non-deadly force to terminate criminal interference with his
property.

(R. 37)

The trial court denied the defendant's

requested instruction which was to the effect that a person
was justified in using force other than deadly force when
necessary to terminate criminal interference with his property.
(R. 38)

In addition, the trial court gave an instruction on

negligent homicide (R. 56, 65) and on accident (R. 59).

The

instruction on accident (R. 59) advised the jury that the killing
was excusable if the defendant "acted with ,., ,., ,., ordinary care
and caution which would be exercised by the ordinary careful and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

under like circumstances "
. 'd ua 1 act;ng
prudent in d ~v~
~

However.

the court's instructions to the jury on negligent ho~icide w~
in accord with the provisions of 76-5-206 and 76-2-103(4), U~
Code Annotated, 1953, defining criminal negligence.

That

standard given the jury was that in order to convict "a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person we
exercise" was required.

The appellant's counsel took excentic

to the failure to give the requested instructions on appellaru
right to use force to terminate interference with his propert'

(R. 283)
The jury returned a verdict of negligent homicide.
ARG1J11ENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
t:I\Y ON THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO USE FORCE TO
jEFJUNATE I~TERFERENCE IJITH HIS PROPERTY.

~l·H:

At the time of trial, counsel for the appellant requeste1
the judge to instruct the jury that a person could use force
other than deadly force in order to terminate criminal interference with the possession of his personal property.
court declined to give such an instruction. (R. 37,38)

The tr
It is

submitted that under the appellant's theory of the case s•1ch:
instruction was proper.

The facts disclosed that Robert Valdi

vehicle was taken from his premises early on the morning of
December 11, 1977.

Because of the manner in which the vehicli

was taken, Valdez believed that ~ebbie Valdez, his daughter,:
have taken the vehicle.

He sought to recover the vehicle wl-Ji:

he believed was probably in the vicinitv.

In the company of
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-7l'rother-in-Ll\·1, BillPJen LeFevre, he cormnenced to look for the
eRr.

lie had previouslv taken a weapon for the purposes of

scaring Debbie Valdez.

~Jhen

he observed his vehicle it was not

being driven by his daughter but by another person whom he had
not given permission to take or use his vehicle.

At the time

that the victim, lfelvin tliller, was operating the vehicle he knew
that it had been taken without permission from Valdez.

(R. 142)

Hiller, upon being told that Robert Valdez had spotted the car,
thought that he and Debbie could still get away if the light
changed.

(R. 143).

felonious.

Miller's action under these circumstances was

§ 41-1-112,

Utah Code Ann. 1953.

587 P.2d 124 (Utah 1978).

Cf. State v. Levin,

Valdez approached Miller according to

his testimony only with a view towards getting his vehicle back
and did not at any time intend to use deadly force.

Valdez had

Miller get out of the vehicle and move to the rear towards the
other vehicle.

At that point Valdez saw Debbie, his daughter,

and was looking at her when the gun went off.

Other witnesses

indicated that Miller struck out at the gun just before it went
off.

!he jury's finding of negligent homicide suPports the

conclusion that the jury believed that Valdez did not intend to
kill Melvin Miller and that the death was the result of Valdez'
negligence.

It in effect was the appellant's Position that the

gun went off unintentionally.

The jury was called upon to

determine under the negligent homicide standard whether the
appellant had been "criminally negligent".
Ann.
1

!t<-

1953.

§ 76-5-206, Utah Code

In order to find the appellant criminally negligent,

jun· had to '"eigh whether the conduct of Valdez under the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-8circumstances constituted "a Gross deviation from the standari
care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circu~
stances if viewed from the actor's standpoint."

In ~aking t~

determination as to whether Valdez' conduct was criminally
negligent or not, the question of whether Valdez had a right

t

use force to terminate Miller's interference with Valdez'
property was a legitimate consideration.

If Valdez had no sw

authority then the use of force could be deemed a gross devi~
from the conduct of an ordinary person under the circumstance'
If he had a right to threaten the use of force his action in
having the weapon could be non-negligent or mere simple negli·
gence.

There is nothing inconsistent between the defense pos'

that the gun went of~ by accident and the right to use force:
ter~i~ate

interference with one's property.

56"

.:_20 (Utah 1977), the defendant was charged with mun

in the second degree.

In State v.

Mit~

This Court reversed a conviction becaui

of a failure to instruct as to the right of the defendant toi
in defense of his habitation.

In response to the contentiont

such a defense is inconsistent with accident, this Court staU
"It is our judgment that the position of the
defendant:
that he was defending what he regarded
as his habitation, is not necessarily inconsistent
with his assertion that the discharge of the gun
and the striking of the deceased in the neck was
~n acc~dent.
Furthermore, even if they were
lnconslstent, that should not deprive the defendant
of either defense.

In a_criminal case the defendant need not s~ecially
plead hls defenses.
The entry of a plea of not guilty
places upon the State the burden of nroving every
el~men~ of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thls glves the defendant the benefit of everv defense
thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt to exist
as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or lack of evidence, in the case; and this is true
whether his defenses are consisten or not.
On the basis of what has been said herein it is
our opinion that if the requested instructio~ had
been ~iven and the jurv had so considered the
evidence, there is reasonable likelihood that it
may have had some effect upon the verdict rendered.
Therefore the defendant's request should have been
granted."
The above case would support the proposition that the defendant
had a right to have submitted to the iury his claim that he had a
right to use force to retake his property or effect an arrest
or in the alternative the killing was an accident.

The jury

was entitled to know that the defenses were not necessarily
inconsistent with one another.
76-2-406, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides:
"A person is justified in using force, other
than deadly force, against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes that force
is necessary to prevent or terminate criminal
interference with real property or personal
property:
(1)

Lawfully in his possession; . . . "

It is well established that the lawful owner or possessor
of property may use reasonable force, other than deadly force,
to protect his chattel property.

In Clark & Marshall, Crimes,

7th Ed. p. 500, it is observect:
"1-Jhile a person cannot take another's life or
inflict great bodily harm in defense of his property,
except when it is necessary to prevent a felony
attempted by violence or surprise, he may use any
force short of this that may reasonably seem to be
necessary in defense of his property, real or personal."
In LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, p. 399, it is stated:
"One is justified in usin?c; reasonable force to
protect his property from . . . theft,. whe;n he
reasonablv believes that his property 1s 1n
immediate. danger of such an unlawful interference
and bythat
the Law
use
ofFunding
such
forceprovided
is bynecessary
to and Library Services
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Library.
for digitization
the Institute of Museum
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
avoid thatLibrary
danger."
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10The motor vehicle in question was lawfully in the possession·
Robert Valdez prior to the action of the victi~ and Valdez'
daughter in interfering with his possession.

He therefore hr

right to use non-deadly force to terminate their interference
with the vehicle.

Further, the mere fact that Robert Valdez:

in his possession a gun and threatened by its display l1elvin
He did n~

Miller did not constitute the use of deadly force.
use deadly force until the gun went off.
threatened such force.

Before then, he mer:

Robert Valdez had a right to threaten

use of deadly force but not the right to use it.

Valdez had

been told Helvin Miller Y.'aS a criminal type and a bad person.
In Perkins on Criminal Law, Second Edition, P. 1028, it is st
"Hisely or umvisely the law tolerates a bluff
which it would not permit to be carried out, and
in a case in which D drew a knife which he
threatened to use, but did not use, in defense
of his property a conviction of assault was
:"eversed on the ground that a threat to use a
weapon may be privileged when its actual use
would not be."
Other authorities recognize the difference between the right
use deadly force and the right to threaten its use.

The

Restatement of Torts, Second§ 81(2) provides:
"The actor is privileged in defense of his . . .
chattels against intrusion to do an act which is
intended to put another in imoediate apprehension
of a harmful or offensive contact or other bodilv
harm or confinement which is in excess of that "
whic~ t~e actor is privileged to inflict, if his
act ~s ~ntended and reasonably believed by him to
be l~kely to do no more than to create such apprehens~on."
··
The same policy is also recognized as to self-defense.
Restatement of Torts, Second§ 70(2).
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See

-11In Stale v. Yancey, 74 N.C. 244 (1876), the principle
was recognized and applied in acquitting a defendant on assault
charges in a dispute over the possession of a saddle.

The

defendant had brandished a knife and declared, "If you don't
turn loose, I'll cut you loose."

The Court stated:

"This conduct of the prosecutor was not such as
to justify an actual battery with the knife in the
first instance, but the defendant had the right
to do what was necessary to @ake the prosecutor
let go his saddle, beginning with moderate force
and increasing in the ratio of the assistance,
without measuring it in golden scales.

A threat to use a deadly weapon, with the power
to do it, may often be justifiable, when a battery
with the same would not be. And this is one of
those cases."
In State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 Pac. 108 (1919), this
Court reversed a conviction where the trial court failed to give
proper instructions as to defendant's theory of the case in a
defense of property situation.
In the instant case, appellant does not contend that the
facts require his acquittal.

It is appellant's position that

the jury should have been instructed that if they found that
appellant was pursuing the victim to terminate the intrusion
of the victim with appellant's property, that he was nrivileged
to so act including threaten, as Valdez impliedly did, the use
of deadly force.

Such an instruction would have allowed the

jury to find that the appellant was acting lawfully in doing
what he did up until the time the gun went off.

Such an

instruction would have alloued and justified the jury in
believing that the appellant's conduct, up until the gun
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-12that an ordinary person would exercise."
Code Ann. 1953.

76-2-103(4), Utah

This was of major significance to the iurv

as their verdict indicates.

The jury could have found that

Robert Valdez did not act unreasonably and that the weanon
went off by simple negligence or without Valdez' fault.

The

instruction requested was therefore critical to appellant's
theory of the case, was properly requested by appellant, and
the failure to give it was prejudicial error.

State v. Terre:

supra; State v. Mitcheson, supra.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN GIVING
INCONSISTENT INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCIDENT AND NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE.
The trial judge instructed the jury in Instruction 17C
excusable homicide by accident (R. 59).

OI

The instruction givei

was as follm>Js:

·:,,e killing of a human being in and of
L~self

is not sufficient to convict the
defendant.
corrnnitted
any lawful
unlawful

The trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included of
of negligent homicide in Instruction 21. (R. 65)

The trial

court instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty
of negligent homicide they would have to find that the

defen~

caused the death of rlelvin l{iller by engaging in conduct 1"hic
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-13constitutes "criminal negligence".

(R. 65)

The court had

previously defined criminal negligence as follows:

(R. 56)

"'\·lith criminal negligence' when he ought
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the surrounding circumstances exist
or the result will occur . . . the risk must be
of such a nature and degree that its disregard
or failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise. . "
The instructions on negligent homicide required a finding of
gross negligence when viewed from the standpoint of the actor
as required by 76-2-103(4) defining criminally negligent conduct.
However, the instruction on accident, which is not based on
anything in the current Utah Penal Code, advised the jury that
the defendant could only be exonerated for the accidental killing
of Miller if they found that he acted with "ordinary care and
caution".

Consequently, the instructions given by the court

created a hiatus betvJeen gross negligence and no negligence.
One standard to convict, one standard to acquit, and the two
standards do not dovetail with one another.

Thus, a hiatus

existed in the instructions as given by the court.

This is

apparently because the instruction on accident appears to have
been taken in part from the definition of excusable homicide by
accident as it existed in the prior penal code.
R.S. Utah 1898 § 4166.

See 76-30-8,

The instruction is not quite in accord

with 76-30-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as it existed under the prior
penal code which was replaced by the current code in 1973,
76-1-102, Utah Code Ann., 1953, Laws of Utah 1973 Ch. 196.
The prior code also defined the term "negligence" in terms
of simple negligence, 76-1-3 (2), Utah Code Ann. 1953.

Thus, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-14negligence under the prior code.

However, the current code

defines negligence in terms of "crir1inal negligence" and
requires a gross deviation from the standard of care of an
ordinary person.

76-2-103, Utah Code Ann. 1953.

Any lesser

standard of negligence, except for automobile homicide, is n[
criminally punishable.

Compare, State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d

220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961) with State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398
(Utah 1977).

The instruction given by the court on accident

was therefore incompatible with the standard for conviction
on negligent homicide which could only have confused the jup
Thus, the jury could have believed that unless the defendant
acted as a reasonable prudent man he was not entitled to acou:
in spite of the instruction given by the court that to convi(
negligent homicide required a higher standard.

Thus, with thi

nvo i-r,::,;->;oistent standards one is left to guess at what stand:
thL

~'

~ight

have applied.

It is submitted that although no exception was taken to'
instruction given on accident, that it was plain error to
the instruction that was given.

gi~

The current Utah penal code

contains no provisions regarding excusable homicide but refer'
generally to justification excluding criminal responsibility.
See, Part 4, Title 76 Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. :
standard that existed as to excusable homicide under the pri~
penal code is different than the standard under the current
code·

p,

Criminal negligence under the prior penal code was def:

in terms of simple negligence.

Criminal negligence under the

current penal code requires a higher level of culnability.

f

the instruction given by the court on accident created a disP
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-15current pRnal code as to criminal negligence and constituted
plain error.

State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936).
CONCLUSIOil

It is respectfully submittec1. that the trial court committed
reversible error.

The defendant is entitled to have the jury

instructed on his theory of the case if the evidence warrants it.
In this case the evidence warranted an instruction to the jury
that the appellant was justified in using force to terminate
the criminal interference with his property.

The court's

refusal to so instruct could only have prevented the jury from
proper consideration of whether appellant was criminally
negligent.
The court also committed prejudicial, plain error in
giving an instruction on accident that was outside of current
penal code and not compatible with the instruction given for
negligent homicide.

Prejudicial error was committed, this

Court should reverse.

R~~tfully submitt~d,

~~~
Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Appellant
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